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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of U tab
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent
No. 7273

vs.
ROBERT S. HARRIES,
Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant and appellant herein was indicted
by a grand jury of Salt Lake County, Utah, June 26,
1948, for the commission of the crime of receiving a
bribe as an executive officer of this state, under the provisions of section 103-26-4, Utah Code Annodated 1943.
(Tr. 1) To this indictment, he entered a plea of not guilty (Tr. 6), was tried before a jury in the third judicial
district court in and .for Salt Lake County (Tr. 16), was
found guilty of the crime of bribery as charged in the
indictment, and is before this Court on appeal from that
verdict, and the judgment and sentence based thereon.
Defendant makes forty-two assignments of error
occurring at the trial, as set forth in his brief, pages 14
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to 22. We have grouped them for reply as will appear in
the argument.
ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO EROR IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO INSPECT
AND COPY THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY, AND TO GRANT A
CONTINUANCE UNTIL AFTER SUCH INSPECTION.
Defendant assigns as errors Nos. 1 and 2, the refusal of the district court to order the clerk of the court
to make available to the defense for the purpose of inspection and copying the transcript of proceedings before the grand jury, and to grant a continuance until after inspection by defense counsel of that transcript. Apparently defendant's theory is that one indicted has such
a right. We respectfully submit that no such right exists,
and such a theory misconceives the function of a grand
JUry.

At common law the grand jury's province is to hear
the state's case; it is an informing and accusing body
only, and is under duty to hear evidence only on the part
of the prosecution. State v. Bramlett, 164 S. E. 873, 166
S. C. 323. Evidence taken before a grand jury is a confidential matt'er to which the accused has no right of access. Goodman v. United States (C. C. A.-9, 1939) 108 F.
(2d) 516, 127 A. L. R. 265.
In the case of Havenor v. State, 125 Wise. 444, 104
N. W. 116, the Wisconsin court held that one accu'sed of
2
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a crin1e is not entitled to inspect before trial the records
of the grand jury in order to enable him to prepare for
trial or to lay a· foundation to in1peach a witness who
testified before the grand jury. In the case of People v.
Macner, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 451, 171 Misc. 720, the court
stated:
•'The defendant states in his moving affidavit
that he seeks an inspection of the Grand Jury Minutes in order to prepare for trial. The law is well
settled that an inspection 'vill not be granted for
such purpose. (case~ cited) ''
It may be noted from the affidavit and motion of defense counsel (Tr. 13-15) that defendant asserts a right
to inspect the minutes of the grand jury in order to prepare for trial. See also defendant's assignment of error
No. 2 (Defendant's brief p. 15), and argument of counsel on this point (Defendant's brief p. 23-24).
Defendant relies on sections 105-19-9 and 105-19-10,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 13,
Laws of Utah 1947. Section 105-19-9 provides that two
copies only shall be made of grand jury proceedings, one
of which is filed with the clerk of the court and one of
which is delivered to the district attorney. Section 10519-10 provides that the proceedings shall be kept secret,
with two exceptions :
"No member of the Grand Jury, nor any pe.rson at
any time present at any session of the Grand Jury,
shall disclose what he himself or any other grand
juror or person may have said at such session.
No grand juror shall divulge in what manner he or
any other grand juror may have voted on a matter

3
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before them; any grand juror or other person. may,
however, be required by any court to disclose the
testimony of a witness examined before the Grand
Jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is
consistent with that given by the witness before the
Court, or to disclose the testimony given before the
Grand Jury by any person upon a charge against
such person for perjury in giving his testimony, or
upon his trial therefor."
· It would thus appear the legislature intended that
the proceedings may be divulged in two instances; first,
to impeach a witness, and second, in case perjury before the grand jury is charged. Defendant admits access to the transcript for purposes of impeachment (Defendant's brief p. 24) and the question of perjury is not
before the court in this matter.
The common-law rule preserving the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings is modified only to the extent indicated by statute. State v. McDonald, 119 S. W. (2d)
286, 342 Mo. 998.
The responsibility for relaxing the rule of secrecy
of grand jury proceedings, where it may be relaxed, resides in the trial court of which the grand jury is a part,
and such rna tter resides in that court's discretion.
Schmidt v. United States, (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 115 F. (2d)
394. We submit, first, that the trial court had no power
in this case to grant defendant access to the transcript
of grand jury proceedings, and second, that if the statute
may be construed to grant such power, there is no showing of abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying
such access.
4
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It follows neeessarily that as defendant had no right
of access to the transcript of grand jury proceedings,
there 'vas no error in denying defendant's motion for a
continuance in order to inspect such transcript.

PROPOSITION II
THE DENYING OF THE MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE UNTIL .A.FTER THE GENERAL ELECTION
WAS NOT ERROR.
The record shows the indictment found June 26, 1948
(Tr. 1 and 2), that a bench warrant issued and defendant was arrested June 26, 1948 (Tr. 3), and that on July
10, 1948, defendant 'Yas arraigned, entered his plea, and
trial was set for September 13, 1948. (Tr. 6)
The motion for a continuance until after the election
(Tr. 15), together with supporting affidavit (Tr. 13-14)
was filed with the clerk of the court on September 13,
1948, and a minute entry (Tr. 16) shows that it was presented to the court and submitted without argument on
the morning of the trial. It would appear that the withholding of such a motion until the jury panel is present
and the case is. ready to go to trial would indicate the
motion was not taken too seriously by counsel at that
time.
Section 105-30-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides as follows :
"When an action is called for trial, or at any time
previous thereto, the court may, upon sufficient
cause shown by either party by affidavit, direct the
trial to be postponed to another day of the same or
of the next term. But the court shall not postpone
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the trial for a longer time than may be necessary.''
This and previous statutes similar thereto have been
construed several times by this court. The general rule
is that the granting of a continuance in a criminal case
is discretionary with the trial court, and its refusal to
grant a continuance is not reversible error unless clearly
prejudicial. State v. Willims 16~ Pac. 1104, 49 U. 320,
State v. Freshwater 85 Pac. 447, 30 U. 442, 116 Am. St.
Rep. 853, State v. Fairclough, 44 Pac. (2d) 692, 86 U. 326,
State v. Hartman 119 Pac. (2d) 112, 101 U. 298.
At the time the motion was made, there was no affirmative showing that defendant would be prejudiced by
going to trial at that time. The motion states merely
"* * That the trial of this cause be continued and postponed until after the general election next ensuing.''
(Tr. 15) The affidavit in support thereof makes a general allegation that there was at the time ''great aggitation and controversy", and that therefore the affiant believed defendant could not receive a fair and impartial
trial. The motion was submitted without argument. We
respectfully submit that the record shows nothing at the
time the motion for continuance was made, to warrant
a continuance or to constitute the denial of the motion
prejudicial error.
We further submit that the defendant did not show
proper diligence in moving for a continuance. This court,
in the case of State v. Freshwater, supra, held that there
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing
a continuance where the moving party showed lack of
diligence. While the facts of that case differ fro1n this,
we believe the same principle applies. The trial here was

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

held forty-eight days after the arrest was n1ade and
thirty-four days after the arraignment and plea. No motion \Yas filed until the n1orning of the trial, and it was
then subn1itted 'vithout argu1nent. We believe the court
committed no error in denying the n1otion, particularly in
view of the delay in filing thereof.
PROPOSITION III
THE TRIAL COURT CO~{MITTED NO ERROR BY
REASON OF ITS RULINGS UPON MATTERS OF
EVIDENCE.
Appellant has grouped assignments of error, numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19,
.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, . 30 and 31, under
the general proposition that the court committed error in
admitting conversations out of the presence of the defendant between Lack and diverse other persons, Ossana
and his partner, Myers, and others which appellant contends has no reference to the matter charged in the indictment. We will not disturb the appellant's grouping of
these errors for the purpose of meeting his argument.
It is an elementary proposition of law that the acts, declarations, and confessions of one conspirator with third
persons are admissible against a defendant co-conspirator. This rule holds true whether or not the acts, declarations or confessions were made in the defendant's presence or with or without defendant's knowledge. The evidence which is admissible under this rule includes anything said, written,, or done by any conspirator in furtherance of a common plan or purpose. State vs. De Angeles, 269 Pac. 515, 72 Utah 209; State vs. Gillies, 123 Pac.
93, 40 Utah 541; People vs. Farrell, 40 Pac. 703, 11 Utah
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414; State vs. McCurtain, 172 Pac. 481,52 Utah 63; State
vs. Inlaw, 141 Pac. 530, 44 Utah 485; Rose vs. United
States, (Calif.) 149 Fed. (2d) 755; State vs. Brown 53
Idaho 576, 26 Pac. (2d) 131; State vs. Ingalls 4 Wash.
(2d) 676, 104 Pac. (2d) 944. The rule is well stated in the
case of People vs. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364
(370) in which the court held that where an accomplice
and a witness entered into a conspiracy to procure money
from third persons for accused, evidence of conversations
between third persons was competent for the purpose of
showing the source of the money and tracing it to the
accused and for the. purpose of showing that the third
persons were not accomplices. In applying the above
rules the cases uniformly hold that they are applicable to
all acts, declarations and admissions which are done in
furtherance of the common conspiracy.
The trial court submitted this case to the jury on the
theory that in addition to the offense of bribery there
was a conspiracy to violate the liquor laws between the
defendant and those witnesses whose testimony is objected to by defendant. Proof of this conspiracy was
necessary as an element of the offense of bribery as
charged but it was not the offense charged. The defendant was accused of accepting a bribe under section 10326-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943. A conspiracy to violate
the liquor laws is not a part of the crime of bribery,
therefore, these witnesses, while conspirators in the crime
of violating the liquor laws, were not accomplices in the
crime of bribery as charged in the indictment. State vs.
W appenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989. The rule is also
well stated in 1 Nichol's, Applied Evidence, page 302:
''A test by which to determine whether one is an
8
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acco1nplice, so as to require corroboration of his
testin1ony, is to ascertain whether he could be indicted for the offense for which the accused is being tried. ' '
In the W appenstein case, supra, at page 998 of 121 Pacific Reporter, si1nilar objections were raised and the
court very ably stated the law as to what constituted an
accomplice within the meaning of the rule which requires corroboration of an accomplice's testimony.
"Finally; it is contended that the court erred in refusing to give instructions requested by the defendant as to the weight to be given to· the testimony of
an accomplice and as to the necessity for corroboration of such testimony. These requests were based
upon an assumption that Gerald and Tupper were accomplices of the defendant in the commission of the
offense charged. They were not 'accomplices' within the legal significance of that term. The appellant
was charged with accepting a bribe from Gerald
and Tupper, and as an element of the offense the
corrupt agreement between the three was alleged.
The corrupt agreement itself constituted an independent crime-that of conspiracy. If the defendant had been indicted for conspiracy, then Gerald
and Tupper would have been accomplices in that
crime. The conspiracy, however, was not a conspiracy to bribe an officer, but to conduct houses of prostitution in violation of law. While proof of the conspiracy was necessary as an element of the offense
as charged, it was not the offense charged. The
gravamen of the offense was soliciting and accepting
a bribe. The giving or offering of a bribe and the so-
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liciting or receiving of a bribe are two distinct crimes
defined and made punishable by separate sections of
the statute. These sections, so far as here material,
are as follows :
'' 'Every person who * • • shall give, offer or promise, directly or indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward to a person executing any of the functio;ns of a public officer other than as hereinbefore
specified, with intent to influence him.with respect to
any act, decision, vote or other procee~ing in the exercise of his powers or functions, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not
more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than
five thousand dollars, or by both.' Section 2320, Rem.
& Bal. Code.
" 'Every executive or administrative officer or person elected or appointed to an executive or administrative office who shall ask or receive, directly or
indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward, or
any promise thereof, upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion or action upon any
matter then pending, or which may by law be brought
before him in his official capacity, shall be influenced thereby; * * * shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten
years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars, or by both.' Section 2321, Rem. & Bal. Code.
''The prosecution was based upon the latter of these
sections, and it is plain that neither Tupper nor Gerald could have been indicted under that section or
for the crimes therein defined either as principal or
accessory. This is obvious since the section applies
I
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only to public officers, and the statute itself in the
prior section has declared the acts of which Tupper
and Gerald were guilty to constitute a separate and
distinct crin1e. The true test to determine whether
a witness is an accomplice or not is: Could the witness hiinself have been indicted either as principal
or accessory for the crin1e charged and under investigation? If he could not, he is not an accomplice.
l\fanifestly, under that test Tupper and Gerald were
not accomplices; neither had received a bribe, neither was a public officer. * * * ''
Section 103-26-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides:
"Every person who gives or offers any bribe to
any executive officer, or to any peace offic~r or to
any person authorized to enforce the law in this
state, with intent to influence him in respect to any
act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceedings as
such officer, or person authorized to enforce the
law, is guilty of a felony."
The defendant in this case was indicted under the
provision of 103-26-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which
provides:
''Every executive officer, or person elected or appointed to an executive office, who asks, receives or
agrees to receive any b.ribe, upon any agreement or
understanding that his vote, opinion or action upon
any matter then pending, or which may be.brought
before him in his official capacity, shall be influenced thereby is guilty of felony.''
These statutes are substantially

t~e

same as the statutes

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the Wappenstein case and under the rule of that case
the witnesses whose testimony is objected to were not
accomplices of the defendant. It is apparent, therefore,
that the witnesses referred to are conspirators with the
defendant Harries, in liquor law violation, and their testimony is admissable against the defendant who is a coconspirator. However, they are not accomplices with the
defendant in the crime of bribery and, therefore, their
testimony does not need corroboration. Thus, it is clear
that the objections raised by the appellant as to the admission of statements between Lack and others, and
Ossana and others, are without merit.
At the bottom of page 31 of appellant's brief, appellant lists twelve Utah cases without reference to the
propositions for which they stand. Upon reading these
cases, we find that they all lay down the rule that a conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice
unless it is corroborated by other evidence which, in itself, tends to connect the defendant with the. commission
of the offense charged. These cases go on to state the
rule that corroboration is not sufficient if it merely
shows commission of an offense or the circumstances
thereof and that while the corroborator's evidence need
not be sufficient of itself to support a conviction and
need not corroborate an accomplice's testimony on every
material point, it must in and of itself tend to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense and
must be inconsistent with the defendant's innocence, and
it is not enough that it cast a mere suspicion only upon
him. We are in complete agreement with the law as
stated by these cases. It is apparent that the trial court
also so understood the law as evidenced by Instruction

12
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No. 5, which states in part :
''And you are instructed that under the law a conviction cannot be had on the testilnony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence,
which in itself and without the aid of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense, and if you find that the crime of bribery has been committed, as charged in the indictment, * * * and if in your determination of the facts
from a consideration of all the evidence in the case
you find Robert Harries is proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in reaching this determination you base your findings of guilt upon any evidence of a material fact from the testimony of either
of these accomplices, you must then find from other
evidence, independent of the testimony of Lack or
Ossana, evidence which tends to connect the defend-·
ant with the commission of the offense, as in the
fore part of this instruction set forth; otherwise you
must acq~ him. Such corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the circumstances of the
offense or the commission of the offense charged, or
merely tends to cast a grave suspicion on the accused
or is consistent with his innocense.
"On the other hand the corroborating evidence need
not be sufficient of itself to establish the guilt of the
defendant, nor is it essential that ,the testimony of
the accomplice be corroborated on every material
point, but it must, tend to implicate hin1 in, and connect him with, the commission of the offense
charged.''

13
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The trial court proceeded upon the theory that Lack
and Ossana were accomplices as a matter of law if the
·defendant, Harries, were found to be guilty of the crime
charged. Under the Wappenstein case, supra, it is apparent that even Lack and Ossana would fall within the
same classification as the other witnesses to whom appellant objects and their testimony would not need corroboration. However, if the trial court were in error in
instructing the jury that Lack and Ossana were accomplices, whose testimony required corroboration, this error
was manifestly in favor of the defendant inasmuch as the
court required corroboration, where under the W appenstein ruling, it was not necessary. It is clear, however,
that even under the trial court's interpretation that Lack
and Ossana were accomplices, their testimony is most
fully corroborated by the testimony of Myers, Nikas, the
Hatsis Brothers, Bullock, Young and other witnesses.
Assignment of error No. 4 covers the entire opening
statement of the District Attorney (Tr. 65-98). The objections made to the opening statement by counsel for
appellant during the trial were to those items treated
above, i.e. conversations between Lack and Ossana and
others.
The opening statement is not ·evidence. State vs.
Distef~no, 70 Utah 586, 262 Pac. 113. Its purpose is merely to outline the evidence.
In the case of State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120
Pac. (2d) 285, this court stated:
"The purpose of an opening statement is to advise
the jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions
and issues involved, which the jury will have to de-
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termine, and to give then1 a general picture of the
facts and the situations, so that they 'vill be able to
understand the evidence._ Counsel should outline generally 'vhat he intends to prove, and should be allowed considerable latitude. He should make a fair
statement of the evidence, and the extent to which
he may go is largely in the discretion of the trial
court.''
It will be readily seen that the district attorney made
no statement that does not fall within the spirit and the
letter of this rule. Surely if the matters complained of
were properly admitted in evidence, there was no error
in outlining them in the opening statement.
Appellant's assignments of error 32, 33 and 34 have
to do with the court's rulings in sustaining the objection of the State to questions put to the witness, Lunt,
on cross exanrination regarding what ''digging in'' was
done. This matter of "digging in" arose from an anonymous letter sent from Helper, Utah, to Mr. Lunt, charging that the Enforcement Division was playing favorites
among alleged liquor law violators and charging a certain "Harold L." with accepting pay-offs and turning
a large portion thereof over to the head of the Enforcement Division of the Liquor Commission. The State introduced this letter into evidence and ~ir. Lunt testified
on direct examination that he had a conversation with
Mr. Harries about the letter and that he told Mr. Harries:
''There are certain charges there that I think should
be looked into and I want you to dig into this matter." (Tr. 584)
On cross examination appellant's counsel attempted to
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bring out, through witness Lunt, statements that were
made by the defendant Harries. This was objected to as
hearsay and improper examination. The objection was
sustained and the appellant assigns the rulings sustaining objections to this line of testimony as error. It seems
apparent from the court's statements at the time the rulings were made that the court was unusually liberal in
allowing the appellant's counsel to go as ·far as he did
in cross examination of this witness. On page 594 of the
transcript, the court stated:
"THE COURT: You are at liberty to have Mr.
Lunt testify as to things he did and things that Mr.
Harries probably did while they were, (in Price) in
reference to this digging in as a matter of crossexamination, but I believe it is improper t<;> permit
Mr. Lunt to testify here as to what Mr. Harries told
him. It would be hearsay and there is no oppo.rtu~ity
of the State to cross-examine the veracity or the
accuracy of the testimony given by somebody who is
not subject to cross-examination.''
On page 597, the court stated:
''THE COURT: I think you have the right, Mr.
Woolley, to determine from Mr. Lunt what Mr.
Harries and he did as to digging into this, but the
conversation that they had with other men, I don't
believe is proper for Mr. Lunt to reiterate here for
the same reason as I indicated.
''In other words, he is testifying for somebody
else who it not appearing and may never appear.
The objection is sustained. ''
The

~ppellant

cites as error the court's sustaining of
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ihe objection of the State to the question put to the wittess, Lunt, on cross-examination:

"Q. And what occurred?"
Tie witness ans,vered in the following manner:
''Mr. Harries stated to the commission-"
It is obvious, therefore, that the -witness, Lunt, was not
atbmpting to testify as to what occurred but rather as
to what the defendant, Harries, had said· on that occasion and the objection to this answer falls within the rulings of the court above mentioned. On page 600 of the
transcript, the court again sustained the State's objecttion to this line of testimony _and very ably set out the
grounds on which such objections were sustained as follows:
"THE. COURT: The objection is sustained. I
think, Mr. Woolley, after all th~ cross-examination
of Mr. Lunt is on the proposition of whether or not
he told· Mr. Harries to dig in. It is not particularly
how far they dug in or how far Mr. Harries even
dug in, as far as this witness is concerned. You have
the right to test his veracity and his credibility and
to contradict or modify his testimony as to what
he has testified on direct, and that to the effect that
he told Mr. Harries, 'you look into this rna tter. '
Now, I have let you go an awful long ways on that
phase of the matter.''
We submit that the court did, in fact, let Mr. Woolley
go a long way on this matter.
Appellant's assignment of error No. 35 relates to the
objection of the State to a question put to the defendant
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on direct examination as to the nature of testimony cf
one, Steve Nikas and his wife in a trial concerning the
Diamanti knock-over at Price, lJtah. The questions were
as follows: (Tr . 714)
I don't think I asked you about the testimony at the Diamanti trial in Price. State whet:ter
or not one of the Nikas boys was a witness in favor
of the State or the Utah Liquor Control Commission
in that proceeding?
'' Q.

A. Steve Nikas and his wife also testified for
the State in that trial.

Q. And what was the nature of their testimony?
MR. ROBERTS: I object to this, your Honor, as
being hearsay and immaterial.
MR. ASHTON: They have never been witnesses
in this case, Steve Nikas or his wife.''
There does not seem to be any question but what
this was hearsay and immaterial as neither Steve Nikas
nor his wife were witnesses in this proceeding, and an
attempt here to have the defendant relate matters to
which they testified at a Liquor Control Commission proceeding is manifestly immaterial and hearsay and the
court very properly sustained the State's objection to
this question.
Appellant assigns as error No. 16, the court's sustaining of the State's objection to the question, ''Mr.
Lack, will you now please tell the jury· the story of the
burglary in your pharmacy.'' This question was the first
question asked of ;Mr. Lack by defendant's counsel on
cross examination. The State had made no reference
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whatever to any burglary on direct examination. There
was no foundation laid for such ·a question and it was
,vholly outside the scope of the direct examination. There
,vas no error in sustaining the State's objection to this
question.
PROPOSITION IV

THE COURT CO~l~IITTED NO ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court
to give certain requested instructions (Assignments of
Error No. 37,38 and39).
Under assignment of error No. 37, defendant argues
that the court committed error in refusing to give the
last paragraph of defendant's requested instruction No.
1, sta~ed as follows :
''And you are further instructed in this case that
the statements or admissions of the defendant, the
accused, are not sufficient with the testimony of an
accomplice alone to warrant a conviction.'' ( Tr. 33)
In its instruction No. 5, the court charged the Jury
as follows:

* * * and you are instructed that under the law a
conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by other evidence
which in itself and without the aid of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense* * *." (Tr. 43)
d

We believe that the portion of instruction No. 5 quoted
above, together with the remainder of that instruction,
sufficiently covers the law involved in defendant's re-
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quested instruction No. 1 and that, therefore, there is no
error in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 1 verbatim. We take the rule to be that when
members of the jury are fully and fairly instructed upon
a subject, it is not error for the trial court to refuse defendant's proposed in~tructions which are merely repetitious of the law in the instructions as given. People vs.
Parchen 98 Pac. (2d) 1045, 37 Cal. ~pp. (2d) 215. The
Utah court has followed this rule, stating that the trial
court is not required to instruct in the same language as
requested but should give a proper charge on the subject in its own language. State vs. Rosenberg, 35 Pac.
(2d) 1004, 84 u. 402 ..
Defendant assigns as error (Assignment of Error
No. 38) refusal of the court to give his requested instruction No. 2. (Tr. 34) Without quoting the instruction as·
requested, or the instruction as given, we respectfully
submit that the court covered the law properly in its instruction No. 3 (Tr. 41) and instruction No. 6 (Tr. 44)
and there was therefore no error in refusing to give the
instruction as requested. State vs. Rosenberg, supra.
Defendant assigns further as error (Assignment of
Error No. 39) refusal of the court to give defendant's
requested instruction No. 6 ( Tr. 38). This alleged error is
not argued in defendant's brief, and we quite frankly
are, at a loss to determine wherein refusal to give said
requested instruction constitutes error. That is, we fail
completely to see any connection between the statute as
cited in the said instruction No. 6 with the charge
of bribery as set forth. in the indictment and presented
at the trial. It may well have been error for the court
to give such instruction; we see no error in the court's
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refusing to do so.
We respectfully subn1it that defendant's assignment
of error No. 40 does not present an issue to this court.
The exception is quoted as follows :
'·The court erred in giving the instructions to the
jury as given by the court and to the whole thereof
for the reason and on the ground that the same do
not contain a complete statement of the law and matters upon which the jury must, of necessity, have
been instructed in the case and upon the evidence
as received by the court and permitted to go to the
jury and introduced by the State over the objections
of the defendant, and the limitation and extent to
which said evidence might be considered by the
jury, particularly with respect to the numerous and
diverse matters of hearsay and conversations between Cyrus V. Lack, the witness, and several persons called as witnesses and otherwise, and out of
the presence of the defendant." (Tr. 877)
We construe this exception as being directed to all the
instructions to the jury as given.

In the case of State vs. Warner 291 Pac. 307, 79 U.
500, this court held that a mere general exception to an
instruction is unavailing unless the instruction as a whole
is erroneous. Sec. 105-38-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides in part as follows :
'' • * * Exceptions to instructions to the Jury shall
be taken and preserved as in civii cases. ''
This court has held in numerous civil cases that a general e~ception to an entire charge is insufficient if any
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portion of it is correct and that an exception to the instructions as given should be specific enough to show
what part of it is considered error. Ryan vs. Beaver
County, 21 Pac. (2d) 858; 82 U. 27; 89 A. L. R. 1253.
We submit that the trial court correctly stated the law
in its instructions and that therefore assignment of error
No. 40 is not based upon a proper exception.
The defendant assigns as error (Assignment of eror No. 41) the giving of the last paragraph of the court's
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 44). Instruction No. 6 deals with
the evidence offered for the purpose of showing that the
defendant committed other offenses than the one for
which he stood accused. The court points out that such
evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only, not to
prove distil'ct offenses, but only as it bears upon the
question whether or not the defendant was guilty of the
crime as charged. The court cautioned that such evidence was to be considered for no other purpos.e and
then concluded with the allegedly objectionable paragraph as follows: ·
''The value, if any, of such evidence, depends on
whether or not it tends to show that the defendant
entertained the intent which is a necessary element
. of the alleged crime for which he is now on trial, or
that there existed in the mind of the defendant a
plan, scheme, system or design, into which fitted the
commission of the offense for which he is now on
trial.''
The theory upon which the court instructed was the
same as that on which the court admitted hearsay evidence to which the defendant objected and now argues
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as error. The authorities cited heretofore in support of
the admission of such evidence are, we believe, sufficient
justification for this instruction. We respectfully submit
that the last paragraph of the court's instruction No. 6
is a proper statement of the law.

PROPOSITION V
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant based his motion for a new trial. on the
statutory grounds set out in Section 105-39-3 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, although defendant's grounds are num.:.
bered somewhat differently. Section 105-39-4 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, requires that affidavits in support of
the grounds mentioned in subsections ( 2), ( 3), (4) and
(7) of Section 105-39-3 be filed within 30 days after filing
the notice of motion. Defendant's grounds 1, 2, 3, :~ and
10 (Tr. 51), correspond to the grounds mentioned in
Section 105-39-3 which requires affidavits in support
thereof. The defendant filed one affidavit only (Tr. 53)
and that affidavit is in support of grounds 1 and 2 in the
defendant's motion. We submit that grounds 3, 4 and 10
are entitled to no consideration whatever by this Honorable Court inasmuch as they are fatally defective.
Defendant contends that the jury received evidence
out of court and, as stated, filed an affidavit in support
thereof signed by his attorney. The sum and substance
of said affidavit is to the effect that during the course
of the trial the then Governor of the State of Utah issued
a statement to the newspapers, said statement being attached to the affidavit. Upon examination of this statement, we can find nothing therein that is prejudicial to
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the defendant and further, even if it be assumed that
this statement contained prejudicial matter t~ere has
been no showing by the defendant that the jury was influenced thereby. Moreover there has been no showing
by the defendant that the jury was even aware of this
statement.
The remaining grounds urged by the defendant in
support of his motion for a new trial are that the court
misdirected the jury in matters of law and that the court
erred in the decision of questions of law arising during
the course of the trial, and did, and allowed acts in the
cause prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant, and that the verdict is contrary to the law and to
the evidence. Any error upon which these grounds are
based must have been those alleged errors urged by the
defendant which have been heretofore considered in this
brief. We feel that the defendant's assignments of error
are not well taken for the reasons stated hereinbefore.
We submit that the Court committed no error in denying the motion for new trial.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has set out 42 assignments of error in
his brief. We have chosen to group these assignments
under several general subject headings, in as much as
many of the assignments deal with only one proposition
of law. There are no questions of fact before this Court
in the case at bar. Appellant has argued that there is insufficient evidence before the Court to sustain the trial
court's conviction. However, we feel that the authorities
clearly show that the evidence of a co-conspirator is admissible against the defendant and that it does not need
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corroboration under the facts of this case. There is abundant evidence in the record to support the conviction of
the defendant and we sub1nit that the trial court was
liberal to the defendant in its rulings admitting such
evidence.
We urge this Court to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
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